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SORRELL v. IMS HEALTH INC.: SOWING MISCHIEF IN
COMMERCIAL SPEECH PROTECTION
EDWARD J. SCHOEN*
JOSEPH S. FALCHEK**
I. INTRODUCTION
In Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,1 the U.S. Supreme Court in a six to three
decision ruled Vermont’s Prescription Confidentiality Law (“PCL”)2 violated
the First Amendment protections accorded commercial speech.3 PCL
prohibited the sale, disclosure and use of pharmacy records that disclosed the
prescription practices of individual physicians without their consent. PCL
disrupted the practice of “detailing” used by pharmaceutical companies to
ascertain and report the prescription practices of individual doctors and
thereby tailor their marketing efforts to increase sales of prescription drugs.
Equipped with the detailing information, drug samples, and clinical study
results, pharmaceutical sales representatives visit physician offices and pitch
certain drugs for patient illnesses. Denied access to detailing information, the
detailers and drug manufactures sued for injunctive and declaratory relief.
Vermont argued its prohibition “safeguarded medical privacy and diminished
the likelihood that marketing will lead to prescription decisions not in the
best interests of patients or the state.”4 The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed
and ruled PCL violated the detailers and drug manufacturers’ First
Amendment rights, “because of the imprecise fit between means and ends.”5
Sorrell is the first venture of the U.S. Supreme Court into the First
Amendment rights accorded commercial speech in several years and the first


Received the “Best Article Award” for Volume XXV of the Southern Law Journal.
J.D., Professor of Management, Rohrer College of Business, Rowan University, Glassboro,
New Jersey.
**
J.D. Joseph Falchek recently retired as Professor of Management and Chairperson of
Business Administration and Management, McGowan School of Business, King’s College,
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, and maintains his law practice in Plains, Pennsylvania.
1
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
2
Vt. Stat. Ann., tit. 18, § 4631 (Supp. 2010).
3
Sorrell at 2658-59. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito and Sotomayor joined. Justice Breyer wrote the
dissenting opinion in which Justices Ginsburg and Kagan joined.
4
Vikram D. Amar, A First Amendment Feast, or Perhaps a Smorgasbord, During the 2010
Term, 8 A.B.A. PREVIEW 325, 326 (2011).
5
Id.
*
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attempt by the Court to evaluate restrictions on commercial speech in the
context of health care information.6 Indeed, because the Court’s most recent
attempts to resolve commercial speech rights involved compelled
commercial speech, it is refreshing to return to a mainstream commercial
speech case and to the comfortable and well-worn Central Hudson test.7

II. VERMONT’S PRESCRIPTION CONFIDENTIALITY LAW
Vermont enacted PCL in 2007. PCL prohibits health insurers,
pharmacies, and other similar entities from selling or licensing prescriber
identified prescription records or disclosing prescriber identified prescription
records for use in marketing drugs without the prescribers’ consent, and bars
pharmaceutical companies from using prescriber identified prescription
records in marketing drugs without the prescriber’s consent.8 In addition,
6

Elliott B. Pollack, Prescription Data Collection: The Intersection of the First Amendment
and Medical Confidentiality, 7 A.B.A. PREVIEW 313, 315 (2011) (“Sorrell raises issues which
go to the core of our modern health care system, including whether, in a so significantly
regulated area, health care, the Supreme Court should defer to a state’s decision as to
additional regulatory regime designed to achieve legitimate and substantial state interests.
Pharmaceutical companies can engage in unlimited commercial speech; it is their access to
prescription data in the hands of pharmacists via the data miners that lies at the heart of this
important case.”).
7
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980)
(“If the communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity, the
government’s power is more circumscribed. The State must assert a substantial interest to be
achieved by restrictions on commercial speech. Moreover, the regulatory technique must be in
proportion to that interest. The limitation on expression must be designed carefully to achieve
the State’s goal. Compliance with this requirement may be measured by two criteria. First, the
restriction must directly advance the state interest involved; the regulation may not be
sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government’s purpose.
Second, if the governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction on
commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive.”) Under the four-part test, the
speech must be lawful and not misleading, the government interest in regulating commercial
speech must be substantial, the regulation must advance the government interest in a direct
and material way, and the regulation must be narrowly tailored, i.e. there must be a reasonable
fit between the regulation and its intended goals.
8
Section 4631(d) of PCL provides: “A health insurer, a self-insured employer, an electronic
transmission intermediary, a pharmacy, or other similar entity shall not sell, license, or
exchange for value regulated records containing prescriber-identifiable information, nor
permit the use of regulated records containing prescriber-identifiable information for
marketing or promoting a prescription drug, unless the prescriber consents .... Pharmaceutical
manufacturers and pharmaceutical marketers shall not use prescriber-identifiable information
for marketing or promoting a prescription drug unless the prescriber consents ....” Sorrell, 131
S.Ct. at 2660. The information generated by data miners is both rich and highly useful. As
noted by one commentator: “The reach of data collectors’ activities is extensive. Using
pharmacy-sold data, prescriptions and doctors apparently can be correlated to individual
patients. The companies can ‘track [a doctor] over time and determine behaviors’ such as
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PCL carves out a number of exceptions to its ban on prescriber identified
prescription records: health care research, drug coverage formularies, patient
treatment plans, and law enforcement requirements.9
Prior to PCL’s enactment, pharmacies regularly sold prescriber
identified prescription records, developed routinely in filling prescriptions, to
“data miners”—companies that analyze prescriber identified prescription
records to develop reports detailing the prescriber’s practices in issuing
prescriptions to patients—which in turn lease the reports to pharmaceutical
manufactures. Pharmaceutical company sales representatives—”detailers”—
use the reports to refine their marketing efforts to increase the sale of the
pharmaceutical company’s drugs. By better understanding the physician’s
prescription preferences, the detailer uses his office visit with the physician
more effectively to recommend new or different drugs for patients, provide
drug samples, and persuade the doctor on the advantages of the
recommended drug. Because detailing is expensive, pharmaceutical
companies and their detailers focus their attention on pitching higher-profit
brand-name drugs protected by patents, rather than generic drugs.10
Three data mining companies, denied a lucrative source of income, and
an association of pharmaceutical manufacturers of brand-name drugs, denied
a valuable marketing tool, brought suit in Vermont contending PCL violated
their First Amendment rights and requesting declaratory and injunctive
relief.11 The federal district court denied relief. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, deciding PCL violates the data mining and
pharmaceutical manufacturing companies’ First Amendment commercial
speech rights without sufficient justification, reversed and remanded, and the
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.12

III. U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION IN SORRELL
The U.S. Supreme Court quickly determined PCL imposes content- and
speaker-based restrictions on the sale, disclosure and use of prescriberchanges in prescribing patterns. While patients’ names are encrypted, the collector is
nevertheless able to match individual prescription records to patient surveys taken by another
marketing company. This enables the pharmaceutical manufacturer to learn ‘what was and
was not discussed during the doctor appointment . . . .’” Pollack supra note 6, at 313.
9
Vt. Stat. Ann., tit. 18, § 4631(e) (Supp. 2010); Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2660.
10
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2659-60.
11
Id. at 2661-62,
12
Id. at 2662. The decision of the Second Circuit conflicted with decisions of the First Circuit,
which reviewed similar legislation enacted by Maine and New Hampshire and determined
those prescription confidentiality laws did not violate the First Amendment. See IMS Health
Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2010) (Maine) and IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42,
91 (1st Cir. 2008) (New Hampshire).
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identifying information.13 The prohibition against using the prescriberidentifying information for marketing purposes constitutes a content-based
restriction, and the prohibition against pharmaceutical manufacturers using
the prescriber-identifying information for marketing purposes constitutes a
speaker-based restriction. These restrictions terminate detailers’ access to the
prescriber-identifying information, while providing a wide range of other
speakers, with varying purposes and viewpoints, full use of the prescriberidentifying information.14 Moreover, the legislative findings accompanying
the law confirm that PCL was designed specifically to prevent
pharmaceutical manufacturers, the only customer who actually pays for the
information, from using it to promote the sales of brand name drugs, and to
prevent data miners from assembling the information for use by the detailers
in their communications with physicians. Indeed, the Court decided,
Vermont’s determination to cripple drug manufacturers’ ability to promote
brand name drugs moved beyond content-based discrimination to full-blown
viewpoint-based discrimination, justifying the need for heightened judicial
review.15

13

Before doing so, the U.S. Supreme Court initially chided Vermont for changing its reading
of the prohibition on health insurers, pharmacies, and other similar entities from selling or
disseminating prescriber-identified prescription records. During proceedings before the federal
district court and the court of appeals, Vermont contended prescriber-identified prescription
record information could be sold or given away for purposes other than marketing. At oral
argument, however, Vermont changed its position, and insisted pharmacies, health insurers,
and similar entities cannot sell prescriber-identified prescription records for any purpose other
than the exceptions noted above. Accepting the altered definition offered by Vermont, the U.S.
Supreme Court determined PCL could not survive constitutional muster under either
definition. For the purposes of its decision, then, the U.S. Supreme Court assumed that the
opening clause of § 4631(d) prohibits pharmacies, health insurers, and similar entities from
selling prescriber-identifying information, subject to the statutory exceptions set out at §
4631(e).” Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2662.
14
Id. at 2663. See Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993) (prohibiting the
use of newsracks to disseminate commercial messages requires the application of heightened
scrutiny), and Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (heightened scrutiny is
required when the government regulates speech because it disagrees with the message it
conveys).
15
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2661-67. This conclusion enabled the Court to reject Vermont’s
argument that PCL was merely commercial regulation. While the First Amendment does not
prevent commercial regulations from imposing incidental burdens on speech, the Court stated,
PCL “is directed at certain content and is aimed at particular speakers,” and those detrimental
effects are far more than incidental. Id. at 2665. See United States v. United Foods, Inc. 533
U.S. 405 (2001) (assessments imposed by the Department of Agriculture on members of the
mushroom industry for generic advertising programs designed to support the industry violated
the First Amendment rights of objecting mushroom growers, when the advertising program
was the principal focus of the regulatory scheme and could not be said to be ancillary to more
comprehensive regulatory program).
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Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Los Angeles Police
Dept. v. United Reporting Publishing Corp.,16 Vermont argued PCL
regulated access to government information, not speech.17 United Reporting
considered a facial First Amendment challenge to a California statute
denying access to state and local government lists of the names and addresses
of individuals arrested for crimes unless the recipient declared it would not
use the address information directly or indirectly to sell a product or service.
Prior to this enactment, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)
routinely made this information available to anyone for any purpose. United
Reporting Publishing Corporation (URPC) gathered the information from
LAPD and sold it to attorneys, insurance companies, drug and alcohol
counselors, religious counselors, medical practitioners, and driving schools,
which would then offer their respective services to those arrested. Following
the enactment of the above-noted statute, LAPD denied URPC access to the
information, because it could not attest it would not use the information for
commercial purposes. Claiming the statute violated its First Amendment
right to commercial speech, URPC obtained declaratory and injunctive relief
in the Federal District Court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed, ruling that the statute violated United Reporting’s commercial
speech rights under the four-part Central Hudson test.18
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit. In a
relatively short opinion, the Court ruled URPC was not entitled to prevail in
its “facial attack” on the statute, because: (1) URPC did not attempt to
qualify for the information under the statute and was not threatened with any
type of legal punishment; (2) URPC failed to demonstrate the statute suffered
from First Amendment overbreadth; (3) the restrictions upon gaining access
to the arrest record information did not violate URPC’s freedom of speech,
because the statute did not prevent URPC from conveying information it
already possessed to its clients; and (4) California could deny access to the
arrest record information in its possession without violating the First
Amendment.19 In reaching this decision, the Court effectively ruled that the
First Amendment protections of commercial speech do not include a right of
access to government information, and do not apply to situations in which the
speaker is only indirectly impeded (rather than directly prevented) from
making commercial solicitations.
Rejecting Vermont’s argument, the Court ruled in Sorrell that United
Reporting was distinguishable in two respects. First, the prescriber16

L.A. Police Dept. v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999) [hereinafter United
Reporting].
17
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2665.
18
See supra note 7.
19
United Reporting, 528 U.S. at 39-40.
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identification information resided in private hands and the holders of that
information were prohibited from conveying it to others. Restraining the way
information might be used or communicated implicates the individual’s right
to speak.20 Second, unlike URPC which did not attempt to qualify for access
to the government list of criminals and hence did not suffer an actual injury,
the detailing and drug manufacturing companies sought but were denied
access to the prescriber-identification information and suffered a personal
First Amendment injury. Hence, PCL imposed a content- and speaker-based
burden on the detailing and drug manufacturing companies’ own speech,
rather than simply denying access to government information.21
The U.S. Supreme Court also rebuffed Vermont’s argument that
heightened judicial scrutiny is not warranted, because the sale, transfer and
use of prescriber-identifying information are conduct not speech. On the
contrary, the Court insisted, “the creation and dissemination of information
are speech within the meaning of the First Amendment,”22 and Vermont’s
imposition of content- and speaker-based restrictions on the availability and
use of prescriber-identifying information is sufficient to trigger heightened
judicial scrutiny.23
20

Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2665-66, citing Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984)
(protective order maintaining the confidentiality of the names of donors and their contributions
to a religious organization obtained through discovery did not violate the First Amendment,
because it did not prohibit the dissemination of information and did not bar access to
traditionally public information); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (prohibition
against disclosure of content of illegally tapped telephone conversations violated the First
Amendment rights of law-abiding possessor of that information); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491
U.S. 524 (1989) (imposition of fines on The Florida Star for publishing the name of a rape
victim contrary to a Florida statute prohibiting printing, publishing or broadcasting same
violated the First Amendment rights of the newspaper which lawfully obtained that
information); and N.Y.C. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (upholding the
right of the press to publish information of great public concern obtained from documents
stolen by a third party).
21
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2666. In reaching this conclusion, the Court also observed “that
restrictions on the dissemination of government-held information can facilitate or burden the
expression of potential recipients and so transgress the First Amendment.” Id.
22
Id. at 2667 (citing Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 527 (“[i]f the acts of ‘disclosing’ and ‘publishing’
information do not constitute speech, it is hard to imagine what does fall within that category,
as distinct from the category of expressive conduct”)), Rubin v. Coors Brewery Co., 514 U.S.
476 (1995) (information printed in beer labels is speech); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (information contained in credit reports is
speech). See also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (restrictions on
outdoor and point-of-sale advertisements for cigarettes and tobacco products violated the First
Amendment, because they unduly impinged sellers’ opportunity to propose legal transactions
with adults).
23
The court noted: “So long as they do not engage in marketing, many speakers can obtain
and use the information. But detailers cannot. Vermont’s statute could be compared with a law
prohibiting trade magazines from purchasing or using ink.” Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2667).
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Significantly, the Court neither defines nor applies heightened scrutiny
in Sorrell, but resolves the constitutionality of Vermont’s ban on prescriberidentified information under classic Central Hudson commercial speech
principles.24 The court noted: (1) the burden of justifying a content-based law
as consistent with the First Amendment rests with the state; (2) the state must
demonstrate that the statute directly advances a substantial governmental
interest and is crafted to achieve that interest; and (3) there must be a
reasonable fit between the legislature’s objective and the means chosen to
achieve that objective, i.e. the state’s interest is proportional to the burdens
placed on speech and the law does not suppress a disfavored message.25
Vermont advanced two justifications for PCL: (1) protecting medical
privacy (including physician confidentiality), avoiding physician harassment,
and maintaining the integrity of the doctor-patient relationship, and (2)
achieving improved public health and reducing healthcare costs.
Unfortunately for Vermont, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted neither of
them.26
With respect to the first justification, the Court had a number of
objections: (1) the purported purpose of maintaining physician
confidentiality is directly undermined by permitting all parties—for example,
insurers, researchers, journalists, law enforcement officers, and Vermont
itself—other than detailers and pharmaceutical manufacturers to access
prescriber-identifying information; and (2) Vermont chose not to adopt a
more tailored approach to maintaining patient privacy by limiting the access
to the information to a narrow class of applicants similar to the approach
adopted by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996.27 Further, while doctors have the option of withholding prescription
information, that option is designed to favor Vermont’s policy position,
because it discourages physicians from departing from “the State’s goal of
burdening disfavored speech by disfavored speakers.”28 Likewise, Vermont’s
contention PCL assists physicians avoid harassment by pharmaceutical
marketers is better achieved (and far less intrusive on speech) by the
physician’s decision not to meet with detailers who use prescriber-identified

24

Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2668. See supra note 7.
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2667-68.
26
There is some support for Vermont’s position in FEC v. International Funding Institution,
Inc., 969 F.2d 110 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (upholding a provision of the Federal Election Campaign
Act, 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4), which provides that the list of contributors that a political
committee must place on file with the FEC may not be sold or used by anyone else to solicit
contributions or for a commercial purpose). The U.S. Supreme Court does not address this
decision in Sorrell.
27
42 U.S.C. § 1320d–2.
28
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2669.
25
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information.29 Similarly, Vermont’s claim that detailers influence treatment
decisions and undermine the doctor-patient relationship fails to address why
the myriad other permitted uses of prescriber-identified information do not
have the same effect. Indeed, “if pharmaceutical marketing affects treatment
decisions, it does so because doctors find it persuasive,” and the
undocumented concern that pharmaceutical speech might persuade is an
insufficient basis for quieting such speech.30
The Court also determined that the second justification—Vermont’s
desire to lower the cost of medical care and promote public health—was not
directly advanced by PCL. Rather, Vermont sought to attain its policy
objective “through the indirect means of restraining certain speech by certain
speakers,” that is, by “diminishing detailers’ ability to influence prescription
decisions.”31 Indeed, the Court noted, the basis of Vermont’s decision to
eliminate pharmaceutical marketing is its insistence that doctors are strongly
influenced by pharmaceutical marketing. Such reasoning, the Court insisted,
is incompatible with the First Amendment. Just as the First Amendment does
not permit the state to ban picketing, slogans, signs and marches in order to
drive out disfavored public opinions, the state cannot seek to remove a
product it disfavors by prohibiting truthful, non-misleading advertisements
that promote the sale of that product.32 Vermont dislikes and mistrusts
detailers’ use of prescriber-identifying information to promote the sales of
brand-name drugs. It should express that view through its own speech, rather
than burdening the speech of others to hamstring detailing activity.33 The
Court concluded: “The State has burdened a form of protected expression
that it found too persuasive. At the same time, the State has left unburdened
those speakers whose messages are in accord with its own views. This the
State cannot do.”34

29

Id. at 2669-70.
Id. at 2670.
31
Id.
32
Id at 2671. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr, 535 U.S. 357 (2002) (prohibition on
pharmacists’ advertisements for compounded drugs violated the First Amendment); Va. State
Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (prohibition on licensed pharmacists
advertising the prices of prescription drugs violated the First Amendment); 44 Liquormart,
Inc. v. R.I., 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (Rhode Island statute prohibiting advertising of liquor prices
violated the First Amendment); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro Tp., 431 U.S. 85 (1977)
(township ordinance prohibiting the posting of real estate “For Sale” and “Sold” signs for the
purpose of stemming what the township perceived as the flight of white homeowners from a
racially integrated community violated the First Amendment); and Endenfield v. Fane, 507
U.S. 761 (1993) (Florida ban on in-person solicitation by CPAs to potential clients violated the
First Amendment).
33
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2671.
34
Id at 2672.
30
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IV. SOWING SOME MISCHIEF INTO COMMERCIAL
SPEECH PROTECTION
Having followed the topic of commercial speech since its inception35
and written frequently about its ebbs and flows, the authors of this article
were relieved to return to the comfort of a straight-forward First Amendment
commercial speech controversy and decision. For the previous fifteen years,
the U.S. Supreme Court had found itself entangled in compelled commercial
speech issues. In three major decisions, the Court reached three different
conclusions. In Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc.,36 Court ruled that
compelling growers and handlers of nectarines, peaches, and plums to
contribute money to pay for an advertising campaign for California fruits
constitutes a valid economic regulation within the Commerce Clause and
does not violate the First Amendment.37 In United States v. United Foods,
Inc.,38 the Court decided that assessments imposed on the mushroom industry
for generic advertising programs designed to promote the industry violated
the first amendment, because the assessments were not ancillary to a more
comprehensive regulatory program; rather, the advertising in question was
the main component of the regulatory scheme. In Johanns v. Livestock
Marketing Ass’n,39 the Court upheld a mandatory assessment to finance
market and food science research into the nutritional value of beef and
promotional campaigns to market beef domestically and overseas, because
the assessment program constituted government speech which is outside the
purview of the First Amendment.40

35
The U.S. Supreme Court made its first clear statement that commercial speech was entitled
to First Amendment protection in Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens, 425 U.S. 748
(1976). The Court recognized the importance of price information to consumers in making
intelligent decisions, and determined the First Amendment protects the right to advertise any
legal product or service, regardless of how tasteless and excessive the advertisement might be.
36
521 U.S. 457 (1997).
37
The dissenting opinion in Sorrell relies on Glickman for the proposition that Vermont’s PCL
is permissible government regulation of a commercial enterprise. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2673.
38
533 U.S. 405 (2001).
39
544 U.S. 550 (2005).
40
The authors of this article wonder whether a different conclusion might have emerged if the
U.S. Supreme Court had taken one more compelled commercial speech decision. Perhaps the
court might have addressed the right of the recipient of the compelled advertisements to avoid
listening to the advertisement. See Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970)
(upholding the constitutionality of a provision in the Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of
1967 permitting individuals to require a mailer remove his name from the mailing lists and
stop all future mailings to the household). Cf. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463
U.S. 60 (1983) (striking down a statutory provision prohibiting the mailing of unsolicited
advertisements for contraceptive).
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It is comforting to consider restrictions on commercial speech through
well worn framework of the Central Hudson test41 and its familiar
components: whether the commercial speech is lawful and not misleading,
whether the government regulation directly advances a substantial
government interest, and whether the government regulation is reasonably
tailored to achieve the purported government interest. If nothing else, Sorrell
is a reassuring sign that commercial speech has returned to its roots after
wandering around its antechambers for the past fifteen years.
Sorrell, however, is not without its own brand of mischief. As noted
above, the U.S. Supreme Court does not define the heightened judicial
scrutiny that may be applied to cases in which there the government imposes
a content- and speaker-based burden on commercial speech. Sorrell also
fiddles with the “reasonable fit” and the “direct support” elements of Central
Hudson, because it omits the word “reasonable” in its consideration of the
“fit between the government’s means and ends” and states at one point that
the government’s restriction must “at least” directly support the attainment of
a substantial government interest. The Court also substituted the phrase
“drawn to achieve” for “no more extensive than necessary” in testing the
government restriction.42 These mischievous seeds sprouted a bit of
confusion in subsequent commercial speech decisions that have carefully
examined Sorrell.

V. ENSUING CONFUSION IN POST-SORRELL COURT DECISIONS
A handful of commercial speech court decisions that have carefully
examined Sorrell demonstrate how those mischievous seeds have taken on a
life of their own. These cases have involved a wide variety of commercial
speech issues: banning alcohol advertisements in college newspapers,
requiring qualifying language in food label health claims, penalizing in-street
employment solicitation, prohibiting inclusion of stale arrest records in
background consumer reports, and convicting a sales representative for
promoting off-label use of FDA approved medication.

A. Bans on Alcohol Advertisements in College Newspapers
In Educational Media Company at Virginia Tech, Inc. v. Insley,43 the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered an “as applied” challenge
to the alcohol advertisement ban imposed on student newspapers at Virginia
41

See supra note 7.
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2667-68.
43
Educ. Media Co. at Virginia Tech, Inc. v. Insley, 731 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2013).
42
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Tech and the University of Virginia (“UVA”) by the Virginia Alcoholic
Beverage Control Board (the “ABC).”44 Nonprofit corporations, Educational
Media and The Cavalier Daily (hereinafter the “College Newspapers”),
which own the respective student newspapers, challenged the alcohol
advertising ban as violative of the First Amendment. The district court
determined that the alcohol advertising ban was an appropriate commercial
speech restriction given Virginia’s substantial interest in combating underage
and abusive drinking on college campuses, and granted summary judgment
in favor of ABC.45 The Fourth Circuit disagreed, and, finding that the
advertising ban was not appropriately tailored to Virginia’s stated aim,
reversed the judgment of the district court.46
The Court of Appeals began its analysis by examining the College
Newspapers’ argument that the advertising ban had to be reviewed under
strict scrutiny, because the advertising restriction involved both contentbased (alcohol advertisements) and speaker-based (university newspapers)
restrictions. In advancing this argument, the College Newspapers relied on
Sorrell, which also involved content-based (prescriber-identifying
information) and speaker-based (pharmaceutical manufacturers) restrictions
and which, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded, warranted heightened
scrutiny.47 In resolving this argument, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that the
U.S. Supreme Court did not apply heightened scrutiny when it struck down
Vermont’s ban on revealing prescriber-identification information, because
that ban could not survive intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson, and
the “outcome [was] the same whether a special commercial speech inquiry or
a stricter form of judicial scrutiny is applied.”48 The Fourth Circuit, relying
44

Id. at 293.
The district court had previously granted the College Newspapers’ motion for summary
judgment, determining that ABC’s regulation was unconstitutional on its face. On appeal, a
panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed, deciding that ABC’s advertising ban on its face did not
violate the first amendment, and remanded the matter to the district court to determine whether
the advertising ban was subject strict scrutiny and whether advertising ban as applied to the
College Newspapers was unconstitutional. See Educ. Media Co. v. Swecker, 602 F.3d 583 (4th
Cir. 2010). On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court rejected the College
Newspapers argument that the advertising ban was subject to strict scrutiny, and, determining
it was constrained by the panel decision, decided the advertising ban as applied to College
Newspapers passed muster under Central Hudson. Educational Media, 731 F.3d at 296.
46
Educational Media, 731 F.3d at 294.
47
Id. at 297-98. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2664.
48
Educational Media, 731 F.3d at 298. See also Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2667. This reflects the
lack of clarity in the use of the term heightened scrutiny, which sometimes seems to used as a
synonym for intermediate scrutiny, sometimes is used as a variant of strict scrutiny, and
sometimes is used as a level somewhere between intermediate and strict scrutiny. For
example, in Educational Media heightened scrutiny was deemed the equivalent of strict
scrutiny. Educational Media, 731 F.3d at 298. In Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988),
heightened scrutiny in resolving an equal protection claim is synonymous with intermediate
45
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on Sorrell, applied Central Hudson to the alcohol advertising ban and
concluded it failed under intermediate scrutiny as set forth in Central
Hudson.49 The Fourth Circuit also noted that Central Hudson applies to both
facial and as-applied challenges.50 In a facial challenge, the burden of proof
imposed on the government is to show compliance with Central Hudson
without regard to the restriction’s impact on the plaintiff.51 In an as-applied
challenge, the burden is imposed on the state to “justify the challenged
regulation with regard to its impact on the plaintiffs.”52
In applying Central Hudson, the Fourth Circuit noted that the parties
agreed that the speech in question concerns lawful activity and is not
misleading, satisfying the first prong, and that the government interest is
combating underage and abusive drinking on college campuses is substantial,
satisfying the second prong. With respect to the third prong, the Fourth
Circuit stated its prior panel decision had determined that the challenged
scrutiny. See Samantha Rauer, When the First Amendment and Public Health Collide: The
Court’s Increasingly Strict Constitutional Scrutiny of Health Regulations that Restrict
Commercial Speech, 38 AM. J. L. & MED. 690, 706 (2012) (“If Sorrell controls future
decisions, the traditional intermediate commercial speech doctrine may disappear entirely.
Without further clarification from the Court, it seems possible under Sorrell that any other
public health regulations, including food labeling requirements and tobacco warnings, could
also be categorized as content-based. While previous cases merely implied that the Court was
substantively applying a strict scrutiny standard to public health regulations of commercial
speech, Sorrell suggests that strict scrutiny is actually the proper standard for content-based
commercial speech regulations.”) See also: Andres J. Wolf, Detailing Commercial Speech:
What Pharmaceutical Marketing Reveals About Bans on Commercial Speech, 212 W. &
MARY BILL RTS. J 1291, 1323 (2013) (“By elevating the scrutiny under Central Hudson to
strict scrutiny when the law in question enacts a ban, courts can afford commercial speech
more protection when the commercial speech appears most in need of judicial intervention.
Whether the Court should expand strict scrutiny to commercial speech restrictions that stop
short of a ban remains an open question.”) Jennifer L. Pomeranz, No Need to Break New
Ground: A Response to the Supreme Court’s Threat to Overhaul the Commercial Speech
Doctrine, 45 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 389, 433-34 (2012) (“Requiring the same protection for
commercial and core speech ignores the intricacies within First Amendment jurisprudence and
the constitutional values underlying the protection of each. Even worse, subjecting
commercial regulations that tangentially implicate speech to First Amendment scrutiny
threatens to destroy the regulatory system firmly established in the United States. The Court
should maintain the current distinctions between commercial and core speech and reject all
future opportunities to overhaul the commercial speech doctrine.”)
49
Educational Media, 731 F.3d at 298.
50
Id.
51
Educ. Media Co. v. Swecker, 602 F.3d at 588 (4th Cir. 2013). In a facial challenge, the
plaintiff claims: (1) there are no circumstances in which the law would be valid or the law is
plainly invalid, or (2) the law is overbroad in its application compared to the state’s objective.
There is no consideration of the impact of the law on the plaintiff. Educational Media, 731,
F.3d at n.5
52
Educational Media, 731 F.3d at 298. A court considering an as-applied challenge considers
the impact on the plaintiff as established in a developed factual record. Id. at n. 5.
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regulation directly and materially advances the State’s asserted interest. In
resolving the fourth prong, the Fourth Circuit decided the application of the
advertising ban as applied to the plaintiffs was overbroad, because a clear
majority of the readers of the College Newspapers (60% at Virginia Tech and
64% at UVA) are age 21 or older. Hence the College Newspapers had a
protected interest in printing the alcohol advertisements and a majority of
students at both institutions had a protected interest in receiving information
in the ads. For that reason the alcohol advertisement ban was
unconstitutionally overbroad.53 Further, the Fourth Circuit noted, the alcohol
advertising ban attempts to do what the Sorrell court found unacceptable:
keeping people in the dark for their own good by removing popular or
disfavored products from the marketplace by prohibiting their
advertisements.54

B. Qualifying Language in Health Claims on Food Product Labels
In Fleminger, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services,55
Fleminger, Inc. (“Fleminger”), a manufacturer and retailer of green tea, filed
a petition with the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) on May 21, 2004,
seeking authorization to make the following qualified health claims about
green tea on the products’ labels: “Daily consumption of 40 ounces of typical
green tea . . . may reduce the risk of certain forms of cancer. There is
scientific evidence supporting this health claim although the evidence is not
conclusive.”56 The FDA reviewed the studies dealing with green tea and the
risk of cancer, found they addressed only breast and prostate cancer,
determined the scientific evidence in those studies was weak, and concluded
that it was “highly unlikely” that drinking green tea reduces the risk of breast

53
Educational Media, 731 F.3d at 301. Accord, Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96, 107-108,
110-113 (3rd Cir. 2004) (The Commonwealth failed to meet its burden on the third Central
Hudson prong, because students are otherwise bombarded with alcoholic beverage ads which
are not covered by the restriction on college newspapers and hence there is no demonstration
the advertising ban will achieve its objective. The alcohol advertisement ban on college
newspapers also failed the fourth test, because 67% of University of Pittsburgh students and
over 75% of the total University population is over the legal drinking age. Banning alcohol ads
in the Pitt News prevents the newspaper from gaining access to the those over the legal
drinking age and prevents individuals who are over age 21 from receiving the information
conveyed in the ads. The Court found additional justification for striking down the ban on
alcohol advertising ads, because it imposes a significant financial burden on the newspaper by
cutting off advertising revenues from alcohol related ads.)
54
Educational Media, 731 F.3d at 302.
55
Fleminger, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, 854 F. Supp.2d 192 (D. Conn.
2012).
56
Id. at 203.
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and prostate cancer.57 The FDA informed Fleminger by letter dated June 30,
2005, that it was required to add language to his health claim describing the
studies in support of the reduced breast and cancer risk as weak and noting it
was unlikely consuming green tea reduced breast and prostate cancer.58 On
August 5, 2005, Fleminger asked the FDA to consider alternate qualifying
language, and the FDA responded on August 19, 2008, denying the request.
On September 10, 2008, Fleminger suggested in writing that the FDA permit
it to use the following qualifying language: “Green tea may reduce the risk of
cancer of the breast and the prostate. There is credible evidence supporting
this claim although the evidence is limited.” Because Fleminger’s request
was not a formal submission, however, the FDA neither considered nor
authorized the new claim.59
On February 22, 2010, the FDA issued a warning letter advising
Fleminger that the health care claims appearing on its website were
unauthorized, false and misleading, and unless corrected would lead to
enforcement action. Fleminger responded that those claims were based on its
September 10, 2008, letter, to which the FDA did not respond and had not
objected.60 In light of a more recent district court opinion,61 and seeking to
avoid the impression it endorsed the health claim, the FDA agreed to modify
its suggested qualifying language as follows: “Green tea may reduce the risk
of breast or prostate cancer. FDA does not agree that green tea may reduce
the risk because there is very little scientific evidence for the claim.”62
Fleminger than pursued its action in federal district court claiming the FDA’s
qualifying language violated its First Amendment rights.63
The Court preliminarily addressed Fleminger’s claim that Sorrell
modified the traditional Central Hudson framework for evaluating
commercial speech by omitting the word “reasonable” in its consideration of
the “fit between the government’s means and ends” and stating at one point
that the government’s restriction must “at least” directly support the
attainment of a substantial government interest.64 The Court disagreed,
noting that Sorrell “expressly relied on the Supreme Court’s prior

57

Id. at 203-04.
Id. at 204.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 204-05.
61
Alliance for Natural Health U.S. v. Sebelius, 714 F. Supp. 2d 48, 120 (D. D.C. 2010) (The
FDA’s replacement of the plaintiff’s health claim was erroneous because the substituted
language contradicted the health claim and defeated the purpose of making the claim, rather
than merely qualifying the claim with less restrictive language.)
62
Fleminger, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 205 (D. Conn. 2012).
63
Id. at 206.
64
Id. at 196.
58
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articulation of the standard for evaluating commercial speech claims in
Central Hudson” and concluding:
Sorrell did not impact the traditional framework for evaluating
commercial speech under the First Amendment and accordingly the
government must demonstrate a reasonable fit between its ends and
the means chosen to accomplish those ends. The government is
therefore not obligated to demonstrate that its restriction is the least
restrictive means to achieve its ends.”65
The Court then proceeded to apply Central Hudson to the qualifying
language required by the FDA and decided: (1) the FDA has a substantial
interest in determining the validity and truth of health-related claims on food
and requiring appropriate disclaimers to reflect the level of scientific
evidence supporting those claims and thereby protect public health and
prevent consumer confusion;66 (2) the FDA has a substantial interest in
preventing the consumer from incorrectly thinking the FDA has approved a
health claim which is not supported by significant scientific evidence;67 (3)
Fleminger’s proposed disclaimer language is misleading because it does not
accurately reflect the level of scientific support for the claim;68 (4) the FDA
is not required to provide empirical evidence to support its conclusions
Fleminger’s proposed disclaimer language is misleading and will cause the
public to assume the FDA approved the health claim;69 (5) the FDA’s
proposed language that there is little scientific evidence in support of the
Fleminger’s health claim was a reasonable fit with its objective of accurately
reflecting the level or strength of scientific evidence supporting the claim;70
and (6) the FDA’s proposed language that the “FDA does not agree that
green tea may reduce that risk” is overbroad, because it completely negates
the health claim. Rather, the simple statement that “there is little scientific
evidence supporting the claim” achieves the objective of preventing the
public from believing the FDA supported the claim in a narrower manner.71
Hence, having concluded the FDA’s qualifying language on Fleminger’s
health claim did not pass muster under Central Hudson, the Court remanded
the matter to the FDA for further consideration.72

65

Id. at 196-97.
Id. at 209.
67
Id. at 211.
68
Id. at 214.
69
Id. at 216.
70
Id. at 217.
71
Id. at 218-19.
72
Id. at 220.
66
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C. Banning In-Street Employment Solicitation
In Valle Del Sol Inc. v. Whiting,73 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the federal district court granting an injunction
against enforcement of Arizona’s Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe
Neighborhoods Act (“the Act”), which, among other things, criminalized instreet employment solicitation that impeded or blocked traffic.74 Day
laborers, who lack a fixed place of employment, perform temporary work
such as gardening, moving, construction, house cleaning and elder care. Prior
to the passage of the Act, in order to advertise the availability of their
services, day laborers gathered in visible locations, such as street corners and
sidewalks, and used gestures and signals to communicate their availability to
motorists or others congregated at the location. The motorists who wanted to
hire workers often stopped in the roadway to negotiate terms and finish the
hire. After the passage of the Act, fear of prosecution deterred the day
laborers from gathering on public streets and their potential employers from
soliciting work from the roadside. Arizona conceded the Act restricted
speech, but justified those restrictions by claiming day labor solicitation
blocked traffic and presented unique public safety concerns.75
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court’s determination that the
day labor provisions were content-based restrictions on commercial speech,
not political speech, even though “vital political and economic messages” are
conveyed when the day laborers solicited work, because the primary purpose
of the day laborers’ solicitations was to obtain work and negotiate the terms
of employment.76 The day labor provisions were content-based, because the
day labor provisions targeted one type of speech (day labor solicitation that
impedes traffic) without addressing other roadside solicitations and nonsolicitation speech. Further, the purported objective of promoting traffic
safety was belied by the Act’s “purpose clauses,” which provided the
“provisions of this act are intended to work together to discourage and deter
the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by persons
unlawfully present in the United States.”77 Likewise, the punishment for
violating the day labor provisions were significantly more punitive than
73

Valle Del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 709 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 2013).
See Friendly House v. Whiting, 846 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1054 (D. Ariz. 2012) (“A.R.S. § 13–
2928(A) makes it unlawful for an occupant of a motor vehicle that is stopped on a street,
roadway, or highway and is impeding traffic to attempt to hire a person for work at another
location. Similarly, A.R.S. § 13–2928(B) provides that it is unlawful for a person to enter a
motor vehicle in order to be hired if the vehicle is stopped on a street, roadway, or highway
and is impeding traffic.”).
75
Valle Del Sol, 709 F.3d at 817.
76
Id. at 818-19.
77
Id. at 819.
74
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punishments imposed on violations of other similar traffic violations,
indicating the restrictions were designed specifically to suppress a particular
type of speech.
The Ninth Circuit confirmed the district court’s conclusion that the day
labor provisions are likely unconstitutional, but differed with the district
court’s application of a stricter test gleaned from Sorrell for gauging the link
between the government objectives and the restriction on commercial
speech.78 Rather, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the day labor provisions
were deficient “even under the pre-Sorrell, arguably more governmentfriendly, precedent,” and “[deferred] extended discussion of Sorrell for a
more appropriate case with a more fully developed factual record.”79
Applying the Central Hudson criteria, the Ninth Circuit determined: (1) day
laborer solicitation is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity,
because it is legal in Arizona to hire or be hired for day labor and the day
labor provisions restrict the rights of the worker and employer from
soliciting, negotiating and performing day labor agreements;80 (2) the lower
court’s determination that the day labor provisions directly advanced
Arizona’s interest in traffic safety, while based on weak evidence, was not an
abuse of discretion;81 and (3) there was a substantial likelihood that the
plaintiffs would succeed on their claim, because the government failed to
produce any evidence showing existing laws were insufficient to address
traffic problems associated with day labor solicitation, and because its
restrictions on day labor solicitation do not address other causes of impeded
or blocked traffic, and hence will not achieve their purported purpose.82
Finding that the district court correctly concluded irreparable harm would
occur in the absence of injunctive relief, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s preliminary injunction.83
78

Friendly House, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 1059-60 (“Sorrell modified the commercial speech test
originally set forth in Central Hudson by holding that a content-based restriction on
commercial speech must be drawn to achieve a substantial governmental interest. There must
be a fit between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends. The
pre-Sorrell version of this element, contained in the Central Hudson test, is substantially
similar to the time, place, and manner restrictions for content-neutral speech.”) (quotation and
citation omitted).
79
Valle Del Sol, 709 F.3d at 821.
80
Id. at 823.
81
Id. at 825.
82
Id at 827-28.
83
Id. at 828-29. See Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc. v. City of Worchester, 851 F. Supp.
2d 311 (D. Mass. 2012), in which the federal district court granted the motion of plaintiffs for
summary judgment and a preliminary injunction against enforcement of a City of Worchester
ordinance banning outdoor advertising of tobacco products, because the ordinance violated
tobacco companies’ and tobacco product retailers’ First Amendment right of commercial
speech. In its opinion, the court relied on Sorrell for guidance in applying the third and fourth
parts of the Central Hudson case, and determined the ordinance was improperly designed to
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D. Arrest Record Information in Background Check
Consumer Reports
In King v. General Information Services, Inc.,84 plaintiff, Shamara King
applied for a job in early 2010 with the United Postal Service, which ordered
a background check consumer report on her from defendant, General
Information Services, Inc. (“GIS”). The GIS report stated Ms. King had ten
nolle-prossed criminal charges against her related to an arrest for a criminal
incident in July 2000.85 Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”),86 the
consumer report agency is required to omit records of arrest which antedate
the report by more than seven years.87 Ms. King initiated a class action
lawsuit against GIS for its failure to comply with FCRA by willfully
including outdated arrest records in its consumer reports. GIS filed a motion
for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds the FCRA prohibition on
reporting arrest records violated its First Amendment rights.88
GIS argued that Sorrell made a major shift in the protection given
commercial speech by raising the standard of review from intermediate to
heightened in the case of content- and speaker-based restrictions on
commercial speech, and that the restriction on including stale arrest records
in its reports was a prohibition on disseminating truthful information which
could not survive heightened scrutiny.89
The Court agreed that the GSI consumer reports under review qualified
as speech under the First Amendment,90 but determined those reports were
entitled to reduced constitutional protection, because they conveyed
information about purely private matters of sole interest to GIS and its
customer and were communicated only to the paying subscriber.91 The test
remove a popular but disfavored product from the marketplace. The issue of heightened
scrutiny was not raised in the opinion. Id. at 318-319. Accord Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,
533 U.S. 525 (2001) (striking down Massachusetts’ regulations prohibiting outdoor
advertising of tobacco products within 1,000 feet of a school or playground and indoor, pointof-sale advertising of tobacco products lower than 5 feet from the floor of the retail store).
84
King v. Gen. Info. Serv, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 2d 303 (E. D. Pa. 2012).
85
Id at 305.
86
15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2012).
87
15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(2) (2012). While exceptions are provided for this exclusion under15
U.S.C. § 1681(c)(b), they were inapplicable to Ms. King’s employment application. Those
exceptions are: (1) credit transactions involving a principal amount of $150,000 or more; (2)
the underwriting of life insurance involving a face amount of $150,000 or more; and (3) the
employment of an individual at an annual salary which equals, or which may be reasonably
expected to equal $75,000 or more. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(b) (2012).
88
King., 903 F. Supp.2d at 305.
89
Id at 306, 308.
90
Id. at 307, citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss, supra note 22.
91
King, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 307.
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for analyzing the reduced First Amendment protection given to consumer
reports was intermediate scrutiny as articulated in Central Hudson.92
Moreover, the Court noted, the core meaning of Central Hudson articulation
was reaffirmed by Sorrell, which “stopped far short of overhauling nearly
three decades of precedent.” Rather, the Court emphasized, if the U.S.
Supreme Court “wished to disrupt the long-established commercial speech
doctrine as applying intermediate scrutiny, it would have expressly done so”
and, in the absence of such express affirmation, the Court refrained from
“taking such a leap.”93 Finally, the Court emphasized, Sorrell was
distinguishable. In Sorrell, Vermont attempted to squelch speech involving a
matter of public concern because it disagreed with it. In contrast, the
provision of FCRA under question had nothing to do with favoring one form
of speech over another and thereby influencing a public debate.94
Accordingly, the Court proceeded to consider GIS’s claim under the
commercial speech standard articulated in Central Hudson. In doing so, the
Court decided: (1) that the FCRA disclosure requirements were designed to
achieve a balance between business organizations need for background
information and the privacy protection given to consumers; (2) that the
limitation on reporting stale arrest records directly advanced the
government’s interest in achieving that balance, because it includes
exceptions for significant transactions; (3) that the restrictions on stale arrest
records are narrowly tailored to achieve the desired balance, and, therefore
(4) that GIS’s motion for judgment on the pleadings was denied.95

E. Conviction of Pharmaceutical Sales Representative for Promoting
Off-label Use of FDA Approved Medication
In United States v. Caronia,96 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
the conviction of Alfred Caronia, a pharmaceutical sales representative of
Orphan Medical, Inc. (“Orphan”), for promoting the sale of Xyrem, a
powerful central nervous system depressant and an FDA approved
medication, for “off-label use” violates the First Amendment.97

92

Id., citing Trans Union Corp. v. F.T.C., 267 F.3d 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (restrictions on
speech of credit reporting agency are subject to intermediate scrutiny, not strict scrutiny).
93
King, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 308.
94
Id at 309.
95
Id. at 310-11.
96
United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
97
Id. at 152, 155. Xyrem is described in the opinion as follows: “Xyrem can cause serious side
effects, including difficulty breathing while asleep, confusion, abnormal thinking, depression,
nausea, vomiting, dizziness, headache, bedwetting, and sleepwalking. If abused, Xyrem can
cause additional medical problems, including seizures, dependence, severe withdrawal, coma,
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Under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (the “FDCA”), drugs
cannot be distributed in interstate commerce unless the drug manufacturers
through clinical trials demonstrate they are safe and effective for specifically
identified uses and the FDA approves them for those uses.98 The FDA
prohibits misbranding of drugs. Misbranding, among other things, includes
failure to provide “adequate directions for use,” which is defined as
“directions under which the lay [person] can use a drug safely and for the
purposes for which it is intended.”99 Misbranding is a misdemeanor
punishable by imprisonment for not more than three years and fines not to
exceed $10,000.100 While physicians are permitted to prescribe FDA
approved drugs for any use that is appropriate in their medical judgment,101
and while the FDCA does not expressly prohibit marketing of drugs for offlabel uses, pharmaceutical manufacturers and their sales representatives can
be prosecuted for misbranding if they promote the drug for off label usage,
i.e., a use for which the drug was not approved.102
Xyrem was approved to treat narcolepsy patients who experience
cataplexy and narcolepsy patients who experience excessive daytime
sleepiness. Because Xyrem is associated with serious side effects, the FDA
required a black-box-warning stating the drug’s safety and efficacy were not
established for patients under 16 years of age and elderly patients.103 Caronia
organized various “speaker programs” for Xyrem, during which physicians
for compensation would tout the benefits of the drug for patients with
cataplexy and narcolepsy to other physicians in the audience. If attendees
asked questions about off-label uses of Xyrem, the physician was permitted
to answer but Caronia was not. Instead, he was required to respond that he
was not permitted to answer, and Orphan’s sales representatives would
forward the physician’s question to Orphan, and Orphan would send
information to the inquiring physician.104
On two occasions, Caronia was audiotaped promoting Xyrem to treat
illnesses for which it was not approved and touting use by patients under the
age sixteen and elderly patients.105 The government charged Caronia with
introducing a misbranded drug into interstate commerce by marketing the

and death. Xyrem’s active ingredient is gamma-hydroxybutryate (“GHB”). GHB has been
federally classified as the “date rape drug” for its use in the commission of sexual assaults.”
98
Id. at 153.
99
Id. at 154.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 153.
102
Id. at 154.
103
Id. at 155.
104
Id. at 156.
105
Id. at 156-57.
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Xyrem for an unapproved use with inadequate directions for such use.106
Prior to trial, Caronia moved to dismiss the charges, because they violated
his First Amendment rights. The trial court denied the motion. A jury trial
was conducted, and Caronia was found guilty of two counts of off-label
promotion of Xyrem.107 The court denied Caronia’s post trial motion for
acquittal, and sentenced Caronia to one year of probation and 100 hours of
community service.108 Caronia’s appeal followed.
The core argument raised by Caronia on appeal was that the First
Amendment prohibits the government from criminalizing a pharmaceutical
firm’s truthful and non-misleading promotion for off-label drug use when
such use is not illegal and others are permitted to engage in that speech.109
Notably, the FDCA does not prohibit or criminalize off-label promotion, but
makes it a crime to misbrand a drug.110 While the government insisted that it
was not prosecuting Caronia for promoting off-label drug use, but merely
used evidence of same to demonstrate intention to mislabel the drug,111 the
Second Circuit rejected that distinction, because the government’s conduct
and arguments at trial and the court’s instructions to the jury clearly showed
Caronia was prosecuted for promoting off-label uses for Xyrem. Hence, the
government’s theory of prosecution was based solely on Caronia’s words
promoting off-label use of Xyrem rather than on evidence the label
accompanying Xyrem was somehow misleading. This permitted the
government to prove mislabeling by showing only truthful speech promoting
off-label drug uses. In short, the government prosecuted Caronia for speech
protected by the First Amendment. 112
In determining whether the prosecution of Caronia for promoting offlabel uses of Xyrem passed First Amendment muster, the Court turned to
Sorrell for guidance. Sorrell, the Court observed, decided that
pharmaceutical marketing is a form of expression protected by the First
Amendment and that the Vermont law prohibiting access to prescriber
information constituted both content- and speaker-based restrictions on
protected speech, requiring the application of heightened scrutiny.113 The
Court determined that prosecution of Caronia for promoting off-label uses of
Xyrem was also a speaker-based (pharmaceutical manufacturers) and
content-based (promoting off-label uses of drugs) restriction on speech
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Id. at 157-58.
Id. at 158-59.
108
Id. at 159-60.
109
Id. at 160.
110
Id. at 106, 162.
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Id. at 160-61.
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Id. at 162.
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Id. at 163-64.
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requiring heightened scrutiny.114 Nonetheless, as the U.S. Supreme Court did
in Sorrell, the Court turned to Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny to
decide the constitutionality of Caronia’ prosecution. The Court found that the
first two prongs of Central Hudson were easily satisfied: promoting off-label
uses of drugs is neither illegal nor misleading, and the government interests
in preserving the efficacy and integrity of the FDCA’s drug approval process
and reducing consumption of unsafe and ineffective drugs are substantial.115
The Court next determined that prohibition of off-label promotion of
drugs did not pass the third prong, because the FDCA permitted physicians to
prescribe and patients to use drugs for purposes other than those for which
the drug was approved and to publicize those off-label uses in scientific
journals, but prevented pharmaceutical companies from giving information
about those uses to physicians and patients. Regulations that seek to keep
people in the dark for what the government determines to be in their best
interests demand a high level of skepticism.116 The government’s
construction of the FDCA as legalizing off-label use but prohibiting the free
flow of information about those uses, the Court decided, does not directly
advance the government’s interest of preserving the efficacy of the FDA drug
approval process.117
The Court also determined that the prohibition against off-label
promotion of drugs failed the fourth prong, because it was not narrowly
drawn to accomplish its purpose. Several alternative, less extensive measures
could be employed to do so, such as educational programs, warning systems,
safety tiers, clearer identification of intended and possible uses for the drug
in the approval process, and prohibiting off-label uses deemed to be
dangerous.118 Not having passed Central Hudson muster, the criminal
prosecution of Caronia for truthful off-label promotion of FDA-approved
drugs violated the First Amendment, and Caronia’s judgment of conviction
was vacated and the matter remanded to the district court.

F. Summary
The five cases analyzed above illustrate the mischief unleashed by
Sorrell in stating heightened scrutiny applied to content- and speaker-based
commercial speech restrictions, but applying the pre-Sorrell intermediate
scrutiny in striking those restrictions down. In each of those decisions, the
court was required to address the application of heightened scrutiny and
114

Id. at 165.
Id. at 165-66.
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Id. at 166-67.
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ended up applying unadorned intermediate scrutiny. In Educational Media,
the court of appeals acknowledged heightened scrutiny applied to, but then
turned around and used intermediate scrutiny to struck down, Virginia’s ban
on advertising alcohol beverages in college newspapers. In Fleminger, the
district court reviewed Sorrell, determined it did not alter the Central Hudson
test, and applied pre-Sorrell intermediate scrutiny in striking down the
FDA’s order to include certain qualifying language in the health claims on
the labels of green tea. In Valle del Sol, the court of appeals affirmed the
granting of a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of Arizona’s
prohibition of in-street employment solicitation. In doing so, the court of
appeals disagreed with the district court’s application of heightened scrutiny
and instead employed pre-Sorrell intermediate scrutiny. In King, the district
court upheld the FCRA’s requirement that stale arrest records be excluded
from consumer background reports, determined that Sorrell was
distinguishable, and applied pre-Sorrell intermediate scrutiny. Finally, in
Caronia, the court of appeals acknowledged that Sorrell called for
heightened scrutiny in determining the constitutionality of the FDCA’s
prosecution for misbranding of drugs, but applied pre-Sorrell intermediate
scrutiny in ruling the conviction of the drug company sales representative for
off-label uses of drugs violated the First Amendment.

VI. ADDING SOME STEPS IN REVIEWING CONTENT- AND SPEAKERBASED RESTRICTIONS ON COMMERCIAL SPEECH
When the authors of this article first reviewed the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Sorrell, they were relieved and even happy to see the return to
normalcy in First Amendment protection of commercial speech. While the
Sorrell court for the first time stated content- and speaker-based restrictions
on commercial speech warranted heightened scrutiny, it concluded that
higher level was not required, because Vermont’s law prohibiting
dissemination of prescriber identified prescription information could not pass
muster under the pre-Sorrell intermediate scrutiny test. Lulled by the
seemingly straight-forward application of Central Hudson intermediate
scrutiny test, the authors did not take notice of the subtle changes the
majority opinion made to the language of that test: omitting the word
reasonable in the fit between government means and ends and requiring at
“least direct support” between the two, and substituting “drawn to achieve”
for “no more than extensive than necessary” in testing the government
restriction. Very clearly, the litigants in the handful of cases summarized
above noticed. As those cases indicate, the review of content- and speakerbased commercial speech restrictions in the future will likely require
additional steps in the review of those restrictions: (1) confirming whether
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the restriction is content- or speaker-based, and, if so, acknowledging
heightened scrutiny is the recommended standard; (2) determining whether
the restriction can pass First Amendment muster under intermediate scrutiny,
and, if not, striking the restriction down; and (3) if the restriction passes
muster under intermediate scrutiny, determining whether the restriction can
pass muster under heightened scrutiny.
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